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whatever measures necessary to try to get it out of me." (T. 252, 
254.) Hatch had paid Blackburn only $10,000.00 out of the 
$94,261.44 approved by St. Benedict and paid none of the 
$27,647.75 that was between him and Blackburn. 
To protect his fee, Blackburn filed a lien against St. 
Benedict. (T. 258; R. 25.) 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
HATCH DID NOT PROPERLY MARSHAL HIS EVIDENCE IN THE COURT OF 
APPEALS. RATHER, HE MERELY EMPHASIZED HIS OWN EVIDENCE WHICH IS 
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Hatch failed to marshal 
correctly his evidence and to show that it was insufficient. 
Quoting the standard of review promulgated by this Court, the 
Court of Appeals stated, "To mount a successful attack on the 
trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings." Scharf v. BNG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals further found that Hatch 
did not do this, but instead simply emphasized his own evidence 
which is contrary to the findings. 
In his request for review by this Court, Hatch gainsays 
these conclusions by stating on page seven of his brief: 
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The c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e Cour t of Appeals a r e 
erroneous for the following reasons . In h i s s ta tement 
of the c a s e , Hatch se t fo r th the evidence support ing 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t Ha tch r e t a i n e d 
B l a c k b u r n ' s a r c h i t e c t u r a l s e r v i c e s and agreed to pay 
the f ees s e t f o r t h in the AIA A g r e e m e n t s . A f t e r 
s e t t i n g f o r t h the e v i d e n c e , Hatch then demonstrated 
t h a t the f ac t s which the Court would have r e l i e d upon 
in i t s f i n d i n g s were i n s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t those 
f i n d i n g s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , in the evidence support ing the 
c o u r t ' s f indings were: 
1) Blackburnfs testimony as to his understand!ng 
of the Agreement; 
2) The testimony of Blackburnfs expert witnesses 
as to the reasonableness of the fees set forth in 
Blackburn's October 18, 1986 billing; 
3) Hatch's use of the October 18, 1986 billing 
in his negotiations with St, Benedict's. 
After making these general statements, unsupported by references 
to his b r i e £ 11 i a t I I € • a c 11 i a 1 1 y d i d w hat he said he did, he 
launches into his own evidence on page eight which is contrary to 
the findings, just as he did in the Court of Appeals. 
In any event, let us first see if he did what he said he did 
ir the Court of Appeals, Take subparagraph 3) above, for 
example. Here he is telling this Court that he specifically 
submitted evidence suppo. - .••••- Lt's i : • regard! ng 
Hatch's use of the October lb, 1986 r i ' ! ing in his negotiations 
with St. Benedict. Blackburn invites this Court t- > :ok it pages 
13 an M Hatch's statement of iln* case i . .ef in the 
Court of Appeals, where Hatch supposedly presented evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings regarding the October 18, 
1 9 8 6, b i 1 1 i i • g .. ; - ffered no evidence in 
support of the trial court's finding of fact no. - that Hatch 
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submitted Blackburn's bill "to St. Benedict as part of the buy-
out figure and used it in his negotiation with St. Benedict," 
leading the trial court to conclude: "By utilizing Blackburn's 
final bill in his negotiations for his final settlement with St. 
Benedict, Hatch is in no position to deny that Blackburn's charge 
in his bill of October 18, 1986, is too high." (Conclusion of Law 
no. 2.) 
If Hatch had properly marshalled the evidence, the following 
vital evidence would have been in his brief in support of the 
trial court's finding of fact no. 9, but was not: 
1) Hatch's buy-out bill to St. Benedict for $304,086.66 
that included the full amount of Blackburn's bill to Hatch of 
$121,919.19. (R. 18 and 17, respectively; Appendix, Exhibit no. 6 
and no. 5, respectively.) 
2) St. Benedict's final payment schedule to Hatch detailed 
payment in full to Blackburn, less $27,647.75 for architectural 
services predating the long-term lease between Hatch and St. 
Benedict, which St. Benedict deemed to be a contractual liability 
of Hatch only. (T. 249; R. 49; Appendix, Exhibit no. 7.) 
3) The testimony of Dan Wolterman, president and CEO of 
St. Benedict, that if Hatch's final bill to St. Benedict had not 
included Blackburn's claim for $94,261.44 ($121,909.19 less 
$27,647.75), St. Benedict's final settlement to Hatch would have 
been less that amount. (T. 360.) 
If Hatch had marshalled the evidence on finding no. 9, and 
also on the other findings, he would have realized that it 
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clearly preponderated in favor of Blackburn, At the very least, 
he would have realized that the evidence in support of the 
court's findings were certainly not lacking in support as to be 
"against the clear weight of the evidence," making them "clearly 
erroneous." Pule 52(a), Utah Pules of Civil Procedure; State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). In short, Hatch failed to 
"recognize that the burden of overturning factual findings is a 
heavy one, reflected by the fact that [an appellate court does] 
not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts." Matter of 
the Estate of Bartelf, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
By misapprehending his responsibility, or by deliberately 
ignoring the preponderating evidence, Hatch, in the main, wrote 
his fact statement in his statement of the case in a tenor 
favorable to his case by emphasizing his evidence, calculated to 
posture later his arguments that the evidence supported different 
findings of fact. His statement of facts even improperly 
included references to testimony from depositions, which although 
published at trial in a group with other depositions, were never 
used or read at trial in order to bring particular evidence to 
the consciousness of the trial judge. (See, for example, 
references to Carol Stuckey's deposition on pages 13 and 14 of 
Hatch's brief in the Court of Appeals.) In short, Hatch never 
focuses on specific findings of fact; therefore, he never 
established a basis on which to marshal the evidence in support 
of the court's findings. 
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Second, even the general areas of findings that Hatch 
identifies in his brief before this Court do not comprise the 
totality of findings essential to the court's conclusions of law 
and judgment. For example, nowhere does Hatch discuss in his 
brief before this Court or the Court of Appeals finding of fact 
no. 10 and its implications in the trial: "St. Eenedict accepted 
Blackburn's billing of October 18, 1986, of unpaid services in 
the amount of $121,909.19, except for item seven in the billing 
in the sum of $27,647.45, because the latter amount was for 
services performed prior to the execution of the lease." 
(emphasis added) 
Point Two 
THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY REFUSE TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF HATCH'S 
APPEAL, AND ACCEPT THE FINDINGS AS VALID, IF HE FAILS TO MARSHAL 
PROPERLY HIS EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
AND THEN DEMONSTRATE THAT EVEN VIEWING IT IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT BELOW, THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
On appeal, the appellate court presumes the findings of fact 
to be correct. Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 747 (Utah 1982). This presumption accords with considerable 
deference that is given the trial judge due to his advantaged 
position to the witnesses and his opportunities to hear their 
testimony and observe their demeanor. Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 
P.2d 69 (Utah 1984); Shijoi v. Shijoi, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985). 
Accordingly, on review, the Court of Appeals "views the evidence 
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and a l l in ferences t ha t can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a 
l i g h t most suppor t ive of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s . " (Forton v. 
Por ton , 695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984). 
To have overcome t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n of c o r r e c t n e s s of the 
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , Ha tch had a heavy b u r d e n on a p p e a l of 
c h a l l e n g i n g the s u f f i c i e n c y of t he e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g the 
c o u r t ' s f i nd ings , not to emphasize h i s own ev idence which i s 
con t ra ry to the f i nd ings . In t h i s r ega rd , the Court of Appeals 
accu ra t e ly observed and ru l ed : 
The fac t t h a t Hatch ' s evidence may have supported 
d i f f e r e n t f indings—or even t h a t much of the evidence 
i s a t odds wi th the f i n d i n g s — i s of no consequence 
where the f i n d i n g s t h a t were made a r e n o t shown, 
th rough the marsha l ing p roces s , to have been lacking 
a d e q u a t e e v i d e n t i a r y s u p p o r t . See Mountain S t a t e s 
Broadcast ing Co. v. Neale , 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) ("When the duty to marshal i s not proper ly 
d i s c h a r g e d , we r e f u s e to c o n s i d e r t h e m e r i t s of 
cha l lenges to the f indings and accept the f indings as 
v a l i d . " ) . This r e s u l t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e 
where t h e key f i n d i n g s t u r n on t h e c r e d i b i l i t y 
de te rmina t ions of the t r i a l c o u r t , a matter on which we 
d e f e r to t h a t c o u r t ' s a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n . See 
Southland Corp. v . P o t t e r , 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 5 2 ( a ) . 
In sum, t h e p o l i c y r e q u i r i n g t he p roper m a r s h a l i n g of 
evidence , harsh as i t may seem to Hatch, ensures t h a t before an 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t can cons ide r r evers ing the t r i a l cour t on the 
f a c t s , i t must a t l e a s t have the oppor tun i ty to see the evidence 
the t r i a l judge saw or heard . 
Point Three 
HATCH HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS RENDERED 
A DECISION THAT DEPARTED PROM THE DSUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL 
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PROCEEDINGS THAT IT CALLS FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS COURT'S POWER 
OF SUPERVISION. 
Hatch failed to state in his brief, "with [regard to] each 
question [he] presented, a direct and concise argument explaining 
the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 46 for the 
issuance of the writ." See Pule 49(a)(9), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Nonetheless, the nature of his request for 
review seems premised in the last paragraph of his brief, where 
he states that the Court of Appeals set a higher standard of 
review in his case than has been established by this Court, 
thereby calling for an exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision. Blackburn submits that it is Hatch who 
misapprehends the standard of review, not the Court of Appeals. 
The previous analysis in this brief and the authorities cited 
amply demonstrate that the Court of Appeals applied the proper 
standard of review; therefore, no special or important reasons 
have been stated by Hatch calling for a review by this Court. 
Aside from the issue of the standard of review, this case 
involves only ordinary questions of contract law and damages. A 
review of this case by this Court on those issues would add 
nothing to the development of the law. Accordingly, no special 
or important reasons exist for a review of this case. 
Point Four 
HATCH'S REQUEST FOR A REVIEW BY THIS COURT IS FRIVOLOUS, 
ENTITLING BLACKBURN TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
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Pule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
"...[I]f the court determines that [an]... appeal taken under 
these rules is frivolous..., it shall award just damages, which 
includes single or double costs, defined by Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party." A 
frivolous appeal under Rule 33(b) is "one that is not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse its law." 
In his brief before the Court of Appeals, Hatch failed to 
abide by the fundamental rule of marshalling his evidence 
properly. The memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals 
explained clearly his failing and supported it with well-
established law; yet he now asks this Court for a review without 
stating a "direct and concise argument" for each of his questions 
presented on review, as required by Rule 49(a)(9), nor has he 
stated any "special or important reasons" for a review, as 
required by Rule 46. His general assertion that the Court of 
Appeals applied an overly restrictive standard of review is not 
supported in fact by references to his Court of Appeals' brief 
and not supported by existing law. Blackburn believes that all 
he has done is wail at the wall of authority without complying 
with the standards required for filing an appeal, both in the 
Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court. In the process, 
however, he has continued to burden Blackburn with the needless 
increase in costs of litigation. It seems only equitable that 
Hatch pay Blackburn's expenses connected with this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hatch had his opportunity for an appeal. In that appeal, he 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings were so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
Instead, he chose to essentially reargue his evidence submitted 
in the trial court, construing that evidence in a light most 
favorable to his case and largely ignoring the evidence 
supportive of the trial court's findings. As the Court of 
Appeals observed, "the fact that Hatch's evidence may have 
supported different findings—or even that much of the evidence 
is at odds with the findings — is of no consequence where the 
findings that were made are not shown, through the marshaling 
process, to have been lacking adequate evidentiary support." 
Consequently, when the duty to marshal is not properly 
discharged, the Court of Appeals, based on the authority 
previously cited, must refuse to consider the merits of the 
challenges to the findings and accept them as valid. Therefore, 
Hatch having stated no special or important reasons for review, 
his request for review must be denied. 
Furthermore, Hatch's appeal is not only without merit, it is 
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on its face frivolous. It is just that he pay Blackburn's 
attorney's fees and costs on this appeal. 
Pespectfully submitted this day of November, 1990. 
MICHAEL D. LYON 
Attorney for Appellee 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Pesponse to Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 
this day of November, 1990, postage prepaid, to: 
Kevin V. Olsen 
ANDERSON & DUNN 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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APPENDIX 
1. Cour t of Appeals memorandum d e c i s i o n of May 16 , 1990. 
2 . C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o r d e r o f A u g u s t 2 9 , 1 9 9 0 , d e n y i n g 
r e h e a r i n g . 
3 . F i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l aw . 
4 . Judgment . 
5. Blackburn's bill for $121,909.19 dated October 18, 1986. 
6. Hatch's bill to St. Benedict dated October 23, 1986. 
7. St. Benedict's settlement statement with Hatch. 
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MAY 16/1990 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS /(MWf^oormu 
C*K*fcf f * Court 
OOOOO VmdLn* Appeals 
James A. Hatch, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Thair H. Blackburn, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880503-CA 
Second District, Weber County 
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
Attorneys: Kevin V, Olsen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Michael D. Lyon, Ogden, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
This case was tried to the court. There was conflicting 
evidence presented by the parties. Following trial, the court 
issued a detailed memorandum decision, from which followed the 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court's 
factual findings in this case adequately support its legal 
conclusions and the legal conclusions warrant the judgment that 
was entered. 
Hatch makes several arguments on appeal, but in essence 
he attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings. However, the trial court's findings are not 
properly challenged unless the evidence is correctly marshaled 
and shown to be insufficient. "To mount a successful attack on 
the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal 
all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). See In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Harker v. Condominiums 
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Hatch has not done this, but instead has simply emphasized his 
own evidence which is contrary to the findings. He suggests 
the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The fact that Hatch's evidence may have supported 
different findings—or even that much of the evidence is at 
odds with the findings—is of no consequence where the findings 
that were made are not shown, through the marshaling process, 
to have been lacking adequate evidentiary support. See 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551/ 553 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("When the duty to marshal is not properly 
discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges to 
the findings and accept the findings as valid."). This result 
is particularly appropriate where the key findings turn on the 
credibility determinations of the trial court, a matter on 
which we defer to that court's advantaged position. See 
Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
The single argument on appeal that survives the foregoing 
discussion is Hatch's claim that he is not liable for payment 
under the contract due to the ultimate frustration of the 
contract's purpose. Although the trial court made no findings 
or conclusions on this issue, Hatch claims that the court 
committed legal error in not precluding recovery by Blackburn 
on the grounds of frustration. While we doubt whether this 
doctrines would apply to the facts of this case, we need not 
consider the issue since it was not raised below and we will 
not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g. , Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. 
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 1988). 
While Hatch's appeal is not frivolous, as Blackburn 
suggests, it is without merit. The judgment is accordingly 
affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
880503-CA 2 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
James A. Hatch, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Thair H. Blackburn, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
AUG E-71990 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
Case No. 880503-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Orme. 
The court having considered the petition for rehearing and 
the additional portions of the record filed in this Court on 
May 31, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING REHEARING was 
deposited in the United States mail. 
Kevin V. Olsen 
Anderson & Dunn 
Attorneys at Law 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Michael D. Lyon, Esq, 
Lyon, Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones 
Attorney for Thair Blackburn 
4768 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
DATED this 29th day of August, 1990. 
By _ Z fS. /WVr" , //?* 
Deputy Clerk 
MICHAEL D. LYON (2031) 
Attorney for Defendant 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-4015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. HATCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THAIR H. BLACKBURN, 
Defendant. 








The above matter came on for trial on February 11, 1988, 
before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde. Lawrerice R. Peterson, Jr., 
appeared on behalf of plaintiff James A. Hatch; Michael D. Lyon 
and Robert R. Wallace appeared on behalf of defendant and third-
party plaintiff Thair H. Blackburn; and James W. Freed and Steven 
J. Aeschbacher appeared on behalf of third-party defendant St. 
Benedict Enterprises, Inc. 
The court having heard the testimony and having examined the 
proofs offered by the parties, and having heard the argument of 
counsel, and this cause having been submitted for decision, the 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 99011 
HATCH v. BLACKBURN v. ST. BENEDICT 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. 99011 
court, being fully advised herein, now finds and decides as 
follows: 
Findings of Fact 
1. On or about May 25, 1984, St. Benedict Enterprises, 
Inc. ("St. Benedict") granted James A. Hatch ("Hatch"), a 
developer, an option on real property on the campus of St, 
Benedict Hospital in Ogden, Utah, to work up a feasibility and 
architectural schematics for the construction of a medical 
professional building ("the project" or "the building") on said 
campus, with the further agreement that Hatch would be given a 
long-term lease agreement on the property if he performed under 
the conditions of the option. 
2. On or about August 15, 1984, Hatch requested Thair H. 
Blackburn ("Blackburn"), a licensed Utah architect, to prepare a 
site plan, schematics, and other related architectural services 
in connection with the project. 
3. Prior to August 15, 1984, Hatch had contracted with 
Blackburn to perform services on other projects and was familiar 
with Blackburn's fee arrangements. Hatch directed Blackburn to 
prepare an AIA (American Institute of Architects) contract. 
4. On or about July 8, 1985, Hatch asked Blackburn to 
prepare an AIA contract. On or about July 22, 1985, Blackburn 
submitted to Hatch an AIA contract, but it was not signed because 
it was a construction management form of the standard AIA owner-
2 
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architect contract, wherein Hatch was named as the construction 
manager. Hatch directed Blackburn to prepare only an owner-
architect form of the AIA contract. Before a revised agreement 
could be entered into, Hatch's option with St. Benedict 
terminated. At this time, at Hatch's request, Blackburn prepared 
and submitted to Hatch a bill dated August 10, 1985, for services 
in the sum of §27,647.75. 
5. In September of 1985, Hatch revived the project and 
directed Blackburn to proceed again with his architectural 
services. 
6. On or about May 12, 1986, Hatch and St. Benedict 
entered into a long-term land lease for Hatch to construct and 
operate the building. The lease more than merely authorized, or 
acquiesced in, the construction of the project on the leased 
property; it required Hatch with due diligence to complete the 
project or the lease would be null and void and without force and 
effect. In addition, the use of the building was limited solely 
and exclusively to the medical profession, and it prohibited 
other activities and services within the building which would in 
any manner be incompatible with the St. Benedict Hospital. 
7. The improvements to the leasehold required by the lease 
would have substantially enhanced the value of the freehold even 
though the term of the lease was 35 to 55 years. 
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8. On or about August 25, 1986, Hatch again requested 
Blackburn to provide him with an AIA contract, which Blackburn 
provided on or about September 6, 1986. Hatch retained but never 
signed the contract. 
9. On or about October 15, 1986, St. Benedict desired to 
abandon the project and requested Hatch to submit a figure for a 
buy-out of the lease. Accordingly, Hatch asked Blackburn to 
submit a final bill, which Hatch in turn submitted to St. 
Benedict as part of the buy-out figure and used it in his 
negotiations with St. Benedict. 
10. St. Benedict accepted Blackburn's billing of October 
18, 1986, of unpaid services in the amount of $121,909.19, except 
for item 7 of the billing in the sum of $27,647.45, because the 
latter amount was for services performed prior to the execution 
of the lease. 
11. Hatch retained Blackburn to provide architectural 
services for the total project and not just the shell. 
12. When Blackburn realized he was not going to be paid by 
Hatch, Blackburn filed a lien on St. Benedict's property on 
December 10, 1986, and served the same on an authorized agent for 
St. Benedict on January 7, 1987. 
13. Although no AIA contract was signed, the fees set out 
in the AIA contract were the ones that Hatch and Blackburn agreed 
to. Moreover, Blackburn's architectural fees were reasonable, 
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i n c l u d i n g t h e t e r m i n a t i o n fee of $ 6 4 , 7 1 1 . 0 0 . The t e r m i n a t i o n 
p r o v i s i o n was r e a s o n a b l e to cover such t h i n g s as l o s s of p r o f i t , 
l o s s of work the a r c h i t e c t i s no t a b l e to u n d e r t a k e , t he c o s t of 
c l o s i n g ou t the j o b , e t c . 
14. H a t c h ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he t o ld S t . Benedict , during 
se t t l ement n e g o t i a t i o n s , t ha t he thought Blackburn 's b i l l was too 
high and tha t he would probably pay him only another $10,000.00 
was not t r u e . Likewise, Hatch 's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to Blackburn 
t ha t S t . Benedict had approved for Blackburn only $45,329.00 was 
a l so not t r u e . 
15. P r i o r to t he t e r m i n a t i o n of the p r o j e c t , Hatch paid 
B l a c k b u r n $ 1 8 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o w a r d B l a c k b u r n ' s t o t a l b i l l of 
$139,909.19. After t e rmina t ion of the p r o j e c t , he paid Blackburn 
$10 ,000 .00 from the s e t t l e m e n t p r o c e e d s r e c e i v e d from S t . 
Benedict , reducing Blackburn ' s unpaid claim to $111,909.19. 
16. Although Blackburn ' s claim for a t t o r n e y ' s fees does not 
segregate the l i en a c t i o n from the Hatch a c t i o n , an award of 
$5,000.00 to forec lose the l i e n would seem reasonable , based on 
the observat ion of time and work in c o u r t r e g a r d i n g the l i e n 
aga ins t the t o t a l claim of a t t o r n e y ' s f ee s . 
From the foregoing f i nd ings , the cour t concludes : 
Conclusions of Law 
1. While the AIA c o n t r a c t was not s igned, the fees s e t out 
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in the AIA contract were the ones to which Hatch and Blackburn 
agreed. 
2. By utilizing Blackburn's final bill in his negotiations 
for his final settlement with St. Benedict, Hatch is in no 
position to deny that Blackburn's charge in his bill of October 
18, 1986, is too high. 
3. Blackburn is entitled to a judgment against Hatch for 
$111,909.19. 
4. Prejudgment interest on the judgment is not authorized 
because the damages were not readily determinable, despite the 
court's adoption of Blackburn's October 18, 1986, billing. 
5. Blackburn is not entitled to recover an attorney's fee 
against Hatch because there was no written agreement for payment 
of attorney's fees. Further, the imposition of attorney's fees 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 is not warranted. 
6. No contractual relationship existed between Blackburn 
and St. Benedict, either express or implied. 
7. There was no direct agency relationship between Hatch 
and St. Benedict; however, because the lease required or 
obligated Hatch to construct improvements which would 
substantially enhance the value of the freehold, Hatch was St. 
Benedict's implied agent to the extent of subjecting the premises 
to a lien. 
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8. Although the $139,909.19 is a reasonable fee between 
Blackburn and Hatch, and the statute entitles Blackburn to a lien 
upon or concerning property which he rendered service, performed 
labor, or furnished materials, the lien can only be for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed, or labor provided to 
the land owner. That value would not include the termination fee 
of $64,711.00. Also excluded from the judgment lien would be the 
architectural services covering the original wood frame building, 
since those services were completed prior to the lease between 
St. Benedict and Hatch and would, therefore, not be part of the 
value services contemplated under the lien statute. 
9. Blackburn's lien was properly filed and served upon St. 
Benedict. 
10. Blackburn is entitled to a judgment against St. 
Benedict for $19,550.44 for the value of architectural services 
and $5,000.00 attorney's fees for the foreclose of his lien, for 
a total judgment of $24,550.44, together with interest thereon at 
the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
11. Blackburn is also entitled to a judgment validating his 
lien upon the real property owned by St. Benedict described in 
Blackburn's lien. 
12. Blackburn is also entitled to a judgment foreclosing 
said lien and ordering said real property to be sold as provided 
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by law to satisfy Blackburn's judgment, together with expenses of 
sale and accruing costs. 
13. Because Hatch is responsible for the whole action, 
costs of the action in the sum of $916.97 should be awarded to 
the plaintiff against Hatch. 
14. Blackburn is also entitled to a judgment dismissing 
with prejudice Hatch's complaint and St. Benedict's counterclaim, 
both no cause of action. 
Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
Dated this ,-$& day of March, 1988. 
MJ zona Id 0< //vr/e^ 
RONALD 0 . H Y D E 7 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Rule 2 .9 N o t i c e 
To Lawrence R. P e t e r s o n , J r . , A t t o r n e y for James A. H a t c h , and 
James W. F r e e d , A t t o r n e y for S t . Bened ic t E n t e r p r i s e s , I n c . : 
P u r s u a n t to 2.9 of t he Rules of P r a c t i c e of t h e D i s t r i c t 
C o u r t and R u l e 6 ( e ) , U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , t h e 
u n d e r s i g n e d w i l l s u b m i t t h e f o r e g o i n g f i n d i n g s of f a c t and 
c o n c l u s i o n s of law to the Honorable Ronald 0 . Hyde for s i g n a t u r e 
upon t h e e x p i r a t i o n of f i v e d a y s from t h e d a t e of s e r v i c e of 
t h e s e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law, u n l e s s w r i t t e n 
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objection is filed pn<w i I J Jt time. 
Dated this /Q day of March, 1988. 
MICHAEL D. L!> 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
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MICHAEL D. LYON (2031) 
Attorney for Defendant 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-4015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. HATCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THAIR H. BLACKBURN, 
Defendant. 









Civil No. 9901 1 
The above matter came on r e g u l a r l y for nearing on February 
1 1 , 1 9 8 8 , b e f o r e the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde. Lawrence R. 
Pe terson , J r , appeared on behalf of p l a i n t i f f James A. H a t c h ; 
Michae l D, Lyon and Robert R. W a l l a c e appeared on behalf of 
defendant and t h i r d - p a r t y p l a i n t i f f Thair 0, Blackburn; and James 
W. Fr eed an< 3 S te vei I J Aeschbacher appear ed on beha J f of th i r d -
party defendant S t . Benedic t E n t e r p r i s e s , Inc|. 
The t r i a l was i n d u c t e d upon t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n 
p l a i n t i f f ' s complaj d e f e n d a n t and t h i r d - p a r t y p l a i n t i f f ' s 
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c o u n t e r c l a i m and t h i r d - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t , and t h i r d - p a r t y 
d e f e n d a n t s c o u n t e r c l a i m . 
The e v i d e n c e and arguments of t he p a r t i e s having been heard 
and c o n s i d e r e d , and t h i s c a u s e h a v i n g b e e n s u b m i t t e d f o r 
d e c i s i o n , t h e c o u r t , b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d h e r e i n and h a v i n g 
e n t e r e d i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law, now hereby 
o r d e r s , ad judges and d e c r e e s as f o l l o w s : 
1. Thair H. Blackburn i s hereby awarded judgment aga ins t 
James A. Hatch , of 1268 Eas t 5500 Sou th , Ogden, U t a h , f o r 
a r c h i t e c t u r a l fees in the sum of $111,909.19 and court cos t s in 
t h e sum of $ 9 1 6 . 9 7 , fo r a t o t a l j u d g m e n t in t h e sum of 
$ 1 1 2 , 8 2 6 . 1 6 , t o g e t h e r with i n t e r e s t thereon a t the r a t e of 12 
percent per annum u n t i l pa id . 
2. I n c l u d e d in B l a c k b u r n ' s j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t Hatch , 
Blackburn i s awarded judgment aga ins t S t . Benedict E n t e r p r i s e s , 
I n c . , of 5475 South 500 East , Ogden, Utah, for $19,550.44 and 
i n t e r e s t thereon a t the r a t e of 12% per annum u n t i l p a i d . In 
a d d i t i o n , and not i n c l u d e d in the Blackburn judgment aga ins t 
Hatch, defendant i s awarded judgment a g a i n s t S t . Bened ic t for 
$5,000.00 a t t o r n e y ' s fees and i n t e r e s t thereon a t the r a t e of 12% 
per annum u n t i l pa id . The judgments a g a i n s t S t . Bened ic t a r e 
secured by the l i e n va l ida ted below. 
3 . Blackburn 's l i e n f i l ed December 10, 1986, as entry no 
991954 in the o f f i ce of the Weber County Recorder i s a va l id and 
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subsisting lien upon the following-described real property in 
Weber County, Utah: St- Benedict Hospital campus bounded by 5350 
South Street and 5450 South ^IIHII »n I IK nmtli, Ad.am; Avenuo on 
the east, Washington Terrace corporate limits on the south, and 
Parsons Development Company on the west, also described by the 
following legal description: 
Beginning at the SE Corner, Section 17, T. 5N., R. 1W., 
SLM, thence N00-26f-00" E638.27 feet along the section 
line thence; West 432.46 feet to a point of beginning 
which point is the northeast corner of the here 
described parcel- Thence; S00-26f-00" W 230-0 feet 
thence; N89-34f-00" W 508-0 feet thence; N 00-26'-00" E 
218.08 feet thence; S89-37f-03H E 81.^5 feet thence; 
N00-21,-46,,E 125-0 feet thence; S89-34,-00" E 122.62 
feet thence; N72-25'-34" E 130.49 feet more or less to 
the exterior wall of the St. Benedicts Hospital thence; 
along said wall the following four (4) courses: S17-
34,-26"E 91.93 feet, S65-01 '-18"W 11.21 feet, S18-111-
01ME 26.24 feet, N74-27'-37HE 10.84 feet, thence; 
leaving said exterior wall and running S17-34 ' -26 "E 
41.40 feet thence; S89-34'-QC'E 130.0 feet to the point 
)f beginning. 
Beginning at a point which is N00-26f-00"E 405.50 feet 
along the section line thence; West 66.00 feet ferom 
the SE Corner, Section 17, T.5N., R.lW., SLM thence; 
N89-34f-00HW 366.45 feet thence; N00-26f-00"E 50.0 feet 
thence; S89-34I-00"E 366.45 feet thence; S00-26f-00"W 
50.0 feet to the point of beqinninq. 
Beginning at a point which is N00-26'-00"E 630.19 feet 
along the section line thence; West 940.47 feet from 
the SE Corner, Section 17, T.5N., R.lW., SLM thence; 
SQ0-26f-00"W 218.08 feet thence; N89-34'-00"W 155.55 
feet thence; N00-26'-00"E 217.94 feet thence; S89-37'-
03"E 155.55 feet to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at a point which is the existing southeast 
corner of Wing 5, St. Benedicts Hospital which point is 
N00-26'-00"E 701.38 feet along the section line thence; 
West 505.16 feet from the SE Corner, Section 17, T.5N., 
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R.1W., SLM, thence; S72-25'-34"W 84.67 feet thence; 
N18-11'-01"W 26.24 feet thence; N65-01 • -18"E 11.21 feet 
thence; Nl7-34'-26"W 204.90 feet thence; N72-25,-34"E 
74.18 feet thence; S17-34'-26"E 36.83 feet thence; S72-
25'-34HW 6.0 feet thence; S17-34*-26"E 168.10 feet 
thence; N72-25•-34"E 5.65 feet thence; S17-34'-26"E 
27.65 feet to the point of beginning. Said description 
shall begin on the surface of an existing concrete deck 
(elevation +/-4729.78) and extend vertically thirty one 
(31) feet to a plane of similar description. 
4. The lien adjudged above is hereby foreclosed. The 
above property is hereby ordered to be sold in satisfaction of 
the lien in the sum of $19,550.44, $5,000.00 attorney's fees, 
accruing interest, expenses of sale, and accruing costs, as in 
the case of the foreclosure of mortages, subject to the right of 
redemption. If Blackburn's claim is not satisfied as herein 
provided, he may have judgment docketed for the balance unpaid, 
and execution therefor against St. Benedict. 
5. Hatch's complaint and St. Benedict's counterclaim are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice, both no cause of action. 
Dated this c^9 day of March, 1988. 
/ y Pflfififr/ 0-//y<fa 
DONALD O. HYDE ^ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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THAIR H. B L A C K B U R N , ARCHITECT 
3643 WASHINGTON BLVD, OGDEN, UTAH 84403 PHONE 392-4773 
October 18, 1986 
ST. BENEDICTS MEDICAL ARTS CENTER 
1. Estimated Total Cost; $5,730,251 
2. Total Architectural Fee: 
($5,730,251 x 0.06) $34-3,815.00 
3. Schematic Fee Earned to Date: 
($34-3,815 x 0.10) 34,381.50 
4-. Third Floor Shell Design: 
($337,615 x 0.06 x 0.65) 13,168.°A 
5. Termination Fee - Third Floor Shell: 
($337,615 x 0.06 x 0.05) 1,013.00 
6. Termination Fee - Project Remainder: 
($323,555 x 0.20) 64,711.00 
7. Termination Fee - Original Building: 
(10-10-85) 27,64-7.75 
8. Total Amount Earned to Date: $139,909.19 
9. Payments to Date: 18,000.CO 
TOTAL^AKOUNT DUE TO DATE: $121,909.19 
Refer to Agreement Article 10.4 for Termination Fees 
October 23, 1986 
St. Benedict's Hospital 
5475 S. 500 E. 
Ogden, Utah 84405 
Attention: James P. Lane 
Dear Jim: 
This is a Buy-Out offer on the Land Lease at St. Benedict's broken down as 
follows: 
Regional Development 
a. Bank of Utah Washington Terrace 
b. Bank of Utah South Ogden 
c. Davis County Bank 
d. South Valley National (Paid Off) 
e. Zions National Bank 
Holbrook Heating and Air Conditioning 
Anderson Engineering (Approx.) 
Bradford Group 
Thair Blackburn (Architect) 












It would be appreciated if you could let me know by November 1, 1986. If 
there is a problem or you have any questions, please feel free to contact 
me. 
ydim Hatch 
3293 HARRISON BOULEVARD / SUITE 111 / P.O. BOX 9663 / OGDEN, UTAH 84409 / (801) 392-7654 
DETAIL OF AMOUNT. 
DUE JAMES HATCH 
FOR COSTS I MYRRH) III DEVELEPMONT OF 
MEDICAL OFFICE BUILDING I OK 
ST. BENEDICT'S ENTERPRISES 
Thair Blackburn, Architect $ 94,261 
121,909.19 - 27,647.65 
(Original building design) 
Pre Constructon Financing 70,000 
Anderson Engineering 5,800 
Bradford Group 5,000 
Holbrook Heating & Air Conditioning 2,000 
Regional Development 
(73,337.02 x 110%) - $3,636,49 J7,025 
(money remaining in pre-construct inn loan a<<ount) 
total $254,086 
